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The Summer is passed,
The harvest is gathered,
And we are not filled.
- - Jeremiah
Do not go gentle into that good night
But rage, rage against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
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Over a great arc from the Cape of Good Hope to Central Tanzania and 
Madagascar to Southeast Angola the 1991-92 rains have failed - wholly or 
dominantly. The 1992 harvests will be small fractions of normal and in 
many districts there will be no grain harvest.
The additional import requirements for grain could be over 11,000,000 
tonnes and can hardly be less than 8,000,000. Because entitlements 
(household self-provisioning, agricultural sales, agricultural and small 
town wages) have been devastated, of the order of 25 million persons need
4,000,000 to 5,000,000 tonnes of grain either as food for work (whether 
literally or via cash payments) or grant survival assistance.
This appalling prospect of mass famine on a scale not seen since the 1920s, 
and the burdens averting it will require to be shouldered, falls on already 
debilitated economies and states. The 1990-91 weather was patchy with some 
disaster areas (e.g. Manica Province in Mozambique) with resultant low
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good harvests. With the exception of Botswana, the external balance 
position of the eleven states ranges from precarious to disastrous - $1.5 
billion of additional grain imports cannot be sustained out of present 
foreign exchange earnings and transfer receipts. Budgetary positions are 
little better - the domestic financing of food aid to 20 million souls is 
fiscally unfeasible. A decade of limited economic success in most of the 
economies (Botswana excluded) has eroded infrastructural and institutional 
capacity. A decade of war has nearly destroyed civil governance as well as 
infrastructure in much of rural Angola and Mozambique.
The Four Horsemen Wait
The appropriate imagery is from the medieval representations of the Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Famine mounts to ride. And if it does, 
pestilence will certainly ride after. Nor can one suppose the peace 
processes in Angola and Mozambique, the transition in South Africa or 
levels of violence and disorder in several other states would escape 
unscathed. Where one of the four horsemen rides the others find the way 
open to follow.
A more regional image would be from the subtle, complex, grim cosmology of 
the Makonde people of Tanzania and Mozambique - the vultures no longer 
wheel high and wide looking for prey. They have gathered in a nearby tree 
to wait for their dying dinner to be ready.
That terrible image of brooding vultures in a tree was misunderstood and 
domesticated by some European art critics who termed it the "Partridge in 
the Pear Tree" theme. So too is the stark horror confronting South and 
Southern Africa domesticated in most reports to date.
There is no disagreement that there is a drought; that it is worse than the 
early 1980s droughts (in which over 300,000 persons perished in Mozambique 
and Angola); that millions of tonnes of additional grain imports are needed 
to avert scores of thousands of deaths from famine. There are 
uncertainties as to numbers but neither as to existence nor magnitude.
Nor is there disagreement that much of the grain must be aid - for states 
without import and households without food entitlements; that the 
logistical problems will be immense nor that time is running out if grain
3is to begin reaching consumers in September when such reserves as exist, 
1992 harvests such as they are, and existing import pipelines will have 
been consumed.
But Where Is The Loud Alarm?
But the studies and reports (dating back to late 1991 when the danger first 
became visible) are very low key. So are the build-up of national data and 
analysis. Indeed many of the reports after setting out the road to 
catastrophe go on to say that donors are not in a mood to spend, are 
otherwise occupied (middle and east Europe, Cambodia) and that the logistic 
problems are hopeless - so the scores or hundreds of thousands will die. 
That, however intended, amounts to a paper game of "Pass the Corpses - you 
were warned, our hands are clean of the blood of these just people, see ye 
to it".
The early warning systems have warned. The first blinking amber but now 
flashing red lights have been monitored and read aright. The prospect of 
windrows of corpses has (rather antiseptically and in odourless semi­
statistics) been posed as have the magnitudes of effort needed to avert 
that prospect. But where is the loud call to action? Where the forceful 
presentation to convince politicians and bureaucrats while there is yet 
time? Where the simple, clear releases to the press to arouse public 
concern before TV teams can beam back pictures of the dying too late to 
save many of them?
To revert to the medieval image this is the time for ringing the Tocsin, 
the wild, sustained, clamour of bells to warn of a pressing danger and to 
call out all decent persons to meet it. Unless the tocsin is sounded and 
sustained now, in much of Southern and South Africa by 1992's end, the 
Christmas bells will be tolling for the dead - the needlessly dead of mass 
famine.
II.
REQUIREMENTS: COUNTRY AND REGIONAL SKETCHES
To sound the loud alarm of the tocsin is necessary. It is not sufficient. 
Data must be available to demonstrate the parameters of need and the 
strategic actions and orders of magnitude required to meet it. Because 
there is a four to six month bureaucratic and logistic gap between
4recognition of an impending famine and effective delivery of food to the 
hungry one cannot wait for that data to be exact.
Plus or minus 10 per cent (with good reporting and good luck) or even 20 
per cent margins of error (in cases of severe economic and civil government 
debilitation and strife) are virtually inevitable. This is particularly 
true because late rains (or their absence) can still affect harvests (or 
their absence) in some cases and few, if any, of the yield estimates are 
based on systematic sample surveys. The point of the exercise is to 
provide approximately correct data in time to avert famine not to emphasise 
uncertainty nor to provide precise data on those at risk too late for food 
to be mobilised and transported to save them. The unanimous view of 
experienced observers of disastrous crop damage backed by the 
meteorological record and, in several cases, detailed observation and 
estimation, forms an adequate basis to begin action now.
For the South and Southern African regions and for almost all of the eleven 
countries in them that much data already exists. The quality of the data 
and of its analysis varies as do the chances of late weather shifts 
improving - or worsening - crop prospects in Tanzania and perhaps Zambia 
plus Northern Mozambique and Malawi. Further data checking and analysis, 
however, is not needed primarily to assess need nor to identify key 
elements in meeting it but to articulate operational programmes.
Therefore, they should proceed as a matter of urgency but parallel to 
mobilising external resources and internal logistic and delivery capacity. 
Donor's past scepticism of requests based on preliminary data has, 
understandably, encouraged data checking and analysis prior to presentation 
but in some cases - notably Mozambique - this concentration on order and 
method is in danger of loosing sight of the urgency to take steps to 
initiate action.
The key data relate to:
a. magnitude of food shortfalls (at least at this stage in terms of grain 
equivalent);
b. numbers of persons whose entitlements (from household self 
provisioning, cash sales or waged employment) have been terminated or 
reduced far below the absolute poverty line by the drought and who
5require either relief distribution or food for work (in cash or kind) 
programmes;
c. the port, rail and truck transport logistical capacity for getting food 
imports to affected countries;
d. the internal logistical capacity for moving food from ports (or arrival 
points in landlocked states) to afflicted secondary towns and rural 
areas;
e. the institutional capacity for delivering that food to the persons at 
risk of starvation;
f. the foreign exchange and fiscal requirements which cannot be met by the 
affected states' econoraies/Treasuries (and thus the volume of food aid 
- as opposed to commercial imports) needed.
Normally data on regional surplus countries and intra regional sourcing 
(from South Africa, Zimbabwe and - in some years - Malawi and Tanzania) 
would also be needed. In 1992-93 the sweep of the drought makes that input 
appallingly simple - no country in the South or Southern African regions 
has surpluses to export; all have deficits to cover by imports. The 
regional aspect is crucial but is one of logistics particularly in respect 
of matching port, rail and highway capacity with landlocked state 
requirements not of redeploying surplus grain to meet deficits.
In 1992-93 the South and Southern African regions are largely separable 
logistically and operationally, even if united in a common drought 
disaster. South Africa's drought and resultant import requirements means 
it has no grain to sell to and no port capacity to handle for Southern 
African countries other than Lesotho and - partially - Botswana, Swaziland 
and Namibia. The concept of using Durban as the hub for Southern African 
imports is inherently unsound - it will be clogged with South African 
imports. Further, the nature of the present South African regime precludes 
the normal external government/international agency relationships with the 
afflicted state's government which typify most emergency food aid 
programmes and are both appropriate and possible in Southern Africa.
The balance of this section provides sketches of the data on the eleven 
South and Southern African states on the heads set out above and a regional 
summary. Emphasis is on physical quantity orders of magnitude because mid
61992-mid 1993 grain prices are uncertain and the accounting prices used for 
aid often bear little relation to commercial cif or to each other. A tonne 
of commercial Thai rice feeds as many people as a tonne of EEC, USA or 
Japanese aid rice even if the cif accounting prices of the latter are in 
the range of 1.25 to 3 times as high.
Madagascar is not covered because it is not usually seen as Southern 
African. However, it is subject to the same weather system and lowland 
areas (especially in the South) is experiencing its worst drought in 
decades. A comparable programme is needed, presumptively from the same 
sources and by the same seas routes as for South and Southern Africa.
Country Review
1. South Africa
South Africa is experiencing its worst drought since the 1920's. Near 
total grain crop failures are virtually certain in most of the Orange 
Free State and the Southern, Western and Northern Transvaal. Eastern 
Transvaal, Cape and Natal losses are estimated at 30 per cent to 75 per 
cent. It is now too late for rain to affect the outlook much - the 
harvest, such as it is, has already begun.
Import requirement estimates of the order of 6,000,000 tonnes at first 
sight appear implausible. Normal South African consumption including 
household self provisioning, livestock, industrial uses and commercial 
food marketing can hardly exceed 12,500,000 tonnes for maize and wheat 
combined. Exports are usually in the 2,500,000-5,000,000 tonne range 
implying a total crop of 15,000,000 to 17,500,000 tonnes. A 6,000,000 
tonne import level would imply a 6,000,000 to 7,000,000 tonne domestic 
crop or under 40 per cent of normal. However, looking again at the 
provincial crop estimates brings home the fact that there may well be a 
60 per cent national crop loss. Record lows in rainfall have combined 
with record highs in temperature.
The entitlements destruction is equalling appalling. 1,000,000 farm 
worker household members are believed to have become indigent through 
farmer firings and non hirings. An equal number are probably affected 
by firings in small dorps already strained by the sickness of their 
white farming market base over the past half decade and now convulsed
7by the drought. Adding black farming families who have lost their 
» crops and drought/economic malaise increases in black unemployment
suggests that 4,000,000 to 7,000,000 souls are at risk of famine 
whether food is physically available or not. Charities and churches 
working closely with these people share that perspective and speak of 
starvation as soon as June and of over 1,000,000 in rural or dorp food 
relief programmes already with others not accommodatable and an ever 
rising demand.
The logistical problems posed by 6,000,000 tonnes of grain imports are 
immense. South Africa's ports have recently had surplus capacity but 
largely because a decade of economic stagnation (under 1 per cent 
annual growth) and, more recently, falling grain exports have reduced 
throughout (excluding bulk coal and mineral cargos) while modest 
debottlenecking and capacity expansion have gone unused. 6,000,000 
tonnes additional imports would totally alter that position. Durban 
would again be clogged, Cape Town and Grahamstown at capacity and even 
the white elephant of East London near capacity for the first time in 
perhaps two decades. Certainly Durban would have no capacity to handle 
a significant volume of grain imports for transit to the Southern 
African region beyond Lesotho and, partially, Swaziland and Botswana.
Domestically SATs and road hauliers probably could move the grain to 
towns and most rural areas. There would, however, be little safety 
margin. Institutionally there is clearly inadequate state capacity 
(direct or via NGOs) to handle the 800,000 to 1,400,000 tonnes grain 
relief needed by disentitled households. (That assumes the government 
would give priority to allocating $240 to $450 million - R625 to Rl,150 
million - for that purpose, which is not self evident.) Of R400 
million voted for relief of non-drought absolute poverty via NGOs in 
the last quarter of 1991 only R17 million has been disbursed despite 
NGO applications probably approaching the full amount.
Even were state capacity higher, providing a R625 to Rl,150 million 
slush fund for the present government to distribute if it could would 
hardly be a prudent way of furthering the Codesa led transformation to 
a legitimate government and would clearly violate much national and 
international sanctions legislation. Equally, however, mass starvation 
would be a disastrous - perhaps fatal - context for the Codesa process
8and, one might suppose, inconsistent with providing effective 
humanitarian relief to the victims of apartheid.
Institutional capacity for identification and distribution does exist. 
Community based organisations, churches and trade unions do - at local 
level - have the ability to handle at least 1,000,000 tonnes locally. 
But they number (at that level) several thousand, many with no or
sketchy provincial and national coordinating structures. This gap is
exacerbated because the nature of the apartheid regime and the struggle 
against it has meant that the chief international coordinators of the 
struggle against famine - WFP, UNDP, FAO, UNICEF - are notably absent 
or engaged only in pre planning for post transition programmes.
The only practicable solution would appear to be for WFP, UNDP, WHO and 
UNICEF (together with USAID and EEC) to catalyse a national logistical 
and coordination forum to pump food aid to community level 
organisations. Time is very short if famine is to be averted but no 
other realistic option appears to exist. In the present context it is 
very unlikely that President de Klerk would block or seriously obstruct
such an initiative and it would appear consistent with the latest
United Nations resolutions on relations with and aid to South Africans.
2 . Z i mbabwe
Zimbabwe has experienced disastrously bad rainfall over virtually the 
whole country. The present stocks, committed imports and 1992 harvest 
are not expected to meet commercial demand beyond August. End of year 
stocks are low because the 1990-91 harvest was patchy (though not 
disastrous) and reacting against previous overcaution too much was 
exported.
Imported requirements are estimated at up to 2,000,000 tonnes. This 
appears to be an overestimate - normal self provisioning, livestock 
feeding, industrial and commercial food demand is probably of the order 
of 2,500,000 tonnes (maize and wheat) and normal production 2,750,000 
to 3,250,000 tonnes at present relative grain/alternative crop prices.
A harvest of 500,000 tonnes would imply an over 80 per cent loss which 
seems unlikely. 60 per cent - parallel to South Africa - would imply a
1,250,000 tonne order of magnitude for required imports.
9The loss of entitlements in rural Zimbabwe is severe. Perhaps
3.000.000 persons are in households who have lost most or all or their 
food supply and/or cash income. That would imply 600,000 tonnes of 
basic survival grain (as rations and/or via work for food programmes.
To this however must be added the losses of households with mixed wage 
and agricultural (cash and/or self provisioning incomes) who will need 
partial assistance of perhaps another 300,000 tonnes.
Logistically serious problem exist. There is unlikely to be any 
capacity available at Durban (nor 1,250,000 tonnes on SATs rail routes 
from Durban to Zimbabwe). Maputo port could handle 1,250,000 tonnes 
(plus Mozambican and Swati requirements) but the Limpopo Valley lines 
available added capacity is not over 500,000 and may still be as low as
250.000. The balance would need to go via Resano Garcia transiting 
South Africa and/or via Beira and its corridor. In the latter case 
available additional port capacity is of the order of 1,000,000 tonnes 
(or more) but additional rail capacity available is probably of the 
order of 500,000 and road haulage uncertain albeit not necessarily 
negligible. Once in Zimbabwe the logistics for distribution are 
adequate except for two to three isolated districts.
Institutional capacity is less certain. Over 1982-85 very substantial 
capability in assessing needs and operating work for food and straight 
relief capacity was built up. On paper the structures still exist and 
the political priority for using them certainly remains high. However, 
drought stricken areas in 1990 and 1991 were not served promptly 
because the reporting and coordination system seems to have atrophied. 
Unless it has been revived in response to 1990-91 weaknesses this will 
be a serious weakness.
Zimbabwe's attempted transition from a 4.5 per cent growth trend, low 
capital/grant inflow, comprehensive import licensing economy to a 6.5 
per cent growth trend, high capital/grant inflow, import liberalised 
economy has had a very troubled first year. Import liberalisation/ 
devaluation/inflation have interacted in a non-virtuous spiral, 
inflation has risen despite reduced government borrowing which has not 
been paralleled by any major increase in enterprise investment. 
Therefore $400 to $500 million additional grain import cost (ex 
Harare/Bulawayo) and up to $400 million drought relief/labour intensive
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works cannot be financed either on forex or fiscal account. Mass 
starvation (the first since the 1930's) would make the transition 
economic strategy much harder to sustain. Therefore, food aid 
requirements can be estimated at 750,000 tonnes beyond 1991-92 (largely 
wheat) levels.
As in the case of South Africa, Zimbabwe's grain deficit has a regional 
knock on effect. Zimbabwe's post 1984 surpluses have been the main 
source for imports into two landlocked Mozambican Provinces (Manica and 
Tete) as well as a major one for Mozambican refugees in Malawi, for 
Zambia and - to a lesser degree - for Botswana. Resourcing these 
imports (of the order of 250,000 tonnes) will pose major logistical 
problems.
3. Mozambique
Mozambique is suffering massive crop failure in three of its four 
Southern provinces and near total harvest wipeout in the fourth 
(Manica, which also had devastating drought losses in 1990-91). Tete 
and Sofala in the centre are also seriously affected with near total 
crop losses in some districts probable. Zambesia and Nampula have 
experienced severe drought especially along the coast but the position 
may be less severe in the interior of Nampula and in respect of 
cassava. The Northern provinces of Niasa and Cabo Delgado are believed 
to be less severely affected although the poor conditions in 
neighbouring Malawi and Southern Tanzania suggest caution in assessing 
harvest outcome. February rains may have reduced damage somewhat from 
Zambesia northward but are too late to have had any crop saving value 
in Tete or the Southern provinces. The end of 1991 stock and 1991 
committed food aid pipeline positions are also unsatisfactory. The
1990-91 Tete drought's impact was far from fully offset by additional 
food aid commitments. Only a third of 1991-April 1992 commitments had 
arrived in January 1992 and much of the balance had not even been 
scheduled by donors. Food aid agreements (unlike IMF agreements) have 
no trigger clauses for late or non attainment of targets.
The estimated grain equivalent crop loss is between 750,000 and
1,000,000 tonnes. An additional loss of quasi legal imports from South 
Africa of perhaps 50,000-75,000 tonnes is likely. This is on top of an 
estimated 25 per cent national food supply deficit (after food aid) of
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1,125,000 tonnes in a normal year. Persons directly affected by major 
or total entitlement losses are of the order of 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 
(including war affected displaced and pauperised households who cannot 
be supplied at present levels of food aid and are virtually all 
absolutely poor). In the absence of massive additional food aid the 
rise in food prices would severely affect 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 more 
persons - notably the 30 per cent of urban households (900,000 souls) 
already below the absolute poverty (and adequate diets) line. The 
position in distinctly worse than in 1982 when inadequate food aid 
(more than inability to deliver) resulted in over 200,000 famine 
deaths.
The logistical problems of landing grain at Maputo, Beira and Nacala 
are negligible if Mozambique is seen in isolation. Nacala can handle 
the needs of Nampula, Malawi and transhipment to smaller ports (Pemba, 
Quelimane and coaster/lighter tertiary ports.) However, because of 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia requirements there may be effective port 
capacity constraints at Beira and Maputo which could be eased 
marginally by routing Inhambane and perhaps Xai Xai transhipment cargo 
via Nacala.
Internal transport logistics pose massive problems even at the much 
smaller present food aid and commercial levels. These relate only in 
part to security prevent constraints. Deteriorated, damaged and 
destroyed road and secondary rail links and an inadequate road haulage 
pool (private and public) are significant constraints. However, in 
general rural transport capacity has improved markedly over the past 
three years so that - perhaps with provision of vehicles (whether for 
the public or - on hire purchase terms - the private sector) 90 per 
cent of the afflicted persons could be reached.
Distribution capacity at institutional level is fairly well articulated 
but fragile and none too well coordinated between the central 
government instrumentality (DPCCN) and some of the field level local 
governmental and external non-governmental agencies. However in a 
drought context virtually all households in the severely affected 
district become eligible so that in one importance sense (absence of 
need for tight selection and identification criteria) distribution 
becomes easier. That, however, assumes adequate food aid is delivered
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to meet demand. In its absence selection among households all of whom 
are severely affected by hunger will pose virtually insurmountable 
problems.
Further the present food supply system to 1,500,000 war dislocated 
persons in small camps now supplied from food aid would become 
unsustainable. It is not practicable to feed camp residents alone when 
the surrounding population is severely malnourished and no alternative 
supply of food exists. This reality has already led to high 'leakage' 
and episodic disorder in the hungriest districts - notably in Zambesia. 
Under famine conditions total disorder would be inevitable.
Perhaps 10 per cent of the afflicted people cannot be reached (or can 
be reached only by plane) because they are in areas controlled by or 
cut off from surface transport by the bandidos armados of Renamo. 
Further, Renamo is following a high publicity profile military strategy 
with scattered attacks on visible, soft targets and - even before the 
drought - over half of the 20,000 bandidos were very short of food and 
carrying out murderous raids in Mozambique and Eastern Zambia to avoid 
starvation. Taken together, these conditions ensure that food lorries 
and food distribution points would attract attacks even in accessible 
areas, as, indeed, has been the case from 1981.
This situation raises the question of seeking to have survival food 
transport and distribution recognised by the Government and Renamo as 
"islands of peace". In addition to expanding the present Government 
and NGO programmes this would presumably require international agency 
supervised food distribution to women (who after all do the food 
storage and preparation) in Renamo controlled areas. Despite the 
certainty of leakage to Renamo's bandidos, if that brought safe 
movement of all survival food throughout Mozambique the high priority 
given by the Government to combating absolute poverty and restoring 
food security suggest it might well agree. The ongoing programme for 
provision of immunisation and vaccination supplies (despite levels of 
tetanus toxoid relative to other items suggesting diversion) is a 
precedent. Whether Renamo would agree is less clear but the proposal 
(prematurely floated in 1990) is worth re-examination.
Mozambique's external account and fiscal situations are disastrous. 
About 80 per cent of imports and 50 per cent of the recurrent budget
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(and 90 per cent of the emergency survival budget) are financed by 
external assistance. All 875,000 tonnes of additional grain 
requirements are for food aid which would need to be complemented with 
support for domestic distribution costs.
Famine would have a devastating impact on Mozambique's economic and 
social policy. Rural livelihood rehabilitation can hardly be built on 
the mass graveyards into which a major famine would turn rural 
Mozambique. Nor would starvation and disorder further either the peace 
negotiations with Renamo nor the now unfolding multi party political 
process toward 1993 elections.
4. Malawi
All reports indicate very severe crop damage. This appears to hold 
both for the densely populated South and the normal grain surplus 
Northern area. Entitlements loss will include both household self- 
provisioning/cash sales for affected farmers and loss of seasonal 
agricultural employment for poor (especially female headed households). 
The number of persons requiring at least partial food support may be of 
the order of 3,000,000 largely in female headed and other small farm 
rural households.
Excluding refugees (750,000 plus - official figure is of the order of
900,000 but may be a cumulation of registrations with less accurate 
subtraction of returnees) Malawi normally has a maize surplus and 
imports (largely of wheat) of about 50,000 tonnes.
1992-93 maize import requirements may be, 400,000 to 500,000 tonnes 
plus 'normal' refugee ration imports (100,000?). Spare capacity at the 
Port of Nacala is over 1,000,000 tonnes. The railway to about halfway 
from Nampula to the Malawi border has surplus capacity with the 
probable limit (set by locomotive capacity) in the 400,000 to 500,000 
tonne range. The problem is organising road transport from the end of 
the rehabilitated line to the border at IntralagoB where it could be 
reloaded on Malawi Railways. Internal distribution capacity in Malawi 
appears adequate - institutional capacity for either food for work or 
drought relief distribution in kind more problematic.
The "normal" 100,000 tonnes food for refugees as in the past come 
largely from Zimbabwe's surplus via the Tete Corridor this will need to 
be resourced. Given the road traffic constraint on the Nacala 
Corridor, it may need to be routed via Dar es Salaam or Mtwara both of 
which have surplus port capacity. However, the mobilisation of 
adequate lorries from Mtwara or the transhipment point on the Tazara 
line may pose problems.
Malawi's fiscal and external balance positions are precarious - 
especially as drought is likely to cripple tobacco, cotton, sugar and 
tea exports. Therefore substantial food aid (up to 400,000 tonnes) is 
needed.
Zambia
Zambia almost certainly has a large grain deficit for 1992-93 after 
very poor rains in the South, Centre and East in 1991-92. How large is 
still unclear because of less than fully confirmed reports of above 
average crops in the Southwest and West (which have indeed had 
relatively normal precipitation levels). The North is more a cassava 
than a grain zone and judging by reports from adjacent areas in 
Tanzania and Malawi is facing severe drought conditions.
Under these conditions the prudent rough estimate of maize import 
requirements is 500,000 tonnes. However, if the Western reports are 
wrong that total could be as high as 750,000 (beyond normal - largely 
wheat and rice - requirements of over 100,000 tonnes). The most 
seriously affected direct loosers will be primarily farming households 
on self provisioning and, secondarily, cash sales. The numbers 
requiring survival food relief could be 2,500,000. Even were Western 
surpluses to offset a significant portion of other area deficits the 
domestic need to provide food relief would remain because the drought 
stricken households could not afford to buy grain.
Thus normal (and speedy delivery) sources of imports - South Africa and 
Zimbabwe - have none to supply this year so the entire requirement will 
have to transit Indian Ocean ports. The two plausible ports of entry 
are Dar es Salaam and Beira. Both have substantial surplus port and, 
to a lesser extent, railway effective capacity. The split between the 
two should largely turn on meeting the Zimbabwean and the Zambian
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requirements with the first having priority at Maputo and Beira and the 
balance of the Zambian going via Dar es Salaam. The full 750,000 
tonnes would strain Dar es Salaam and probably exceed Tazara effective 
surplus capacity when taken together with Tanzanian and potential 
Malawian drought grain requirements.
Zambia's internal logistical and institutional capacity for handling 
rural grain movements (whether collecting surplus or distributing 
drought relief) is low and debilitated. In the past it has also not 
engaged the high priority to make it work given in - e.g. Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe. How much improvement is possible in 1992 is 
unclear.
Famine in Zambia would be politically and economically disastrous.
There has been no large scale famine since well before independence so 
that the new government and its economic adjustment/transformation 
policies would inevitably be blamed. Zambia's price, fiscal and 
external balance positions are worse than precarious. Therefore, 
additional food aid of the order of 500,000 tonnes is likely to be 
needed to maintain stability and a dynamic of economic change.
6. Tanzania
Tanzania has had very mixed weather in 1991-92 following a poor 1990-91 
harvest. In the Northern and Lake Regions reports suggest adequate 
rainfall and average to above average grain harvests. However, this 
could still go wrong if the March-May period is rainless.
Central Tanzania is drought hit (apparently including the Iringa 
Highland and Kilambero valley which in normal years are major grain 
surplus areas). Southern Tanzania had very poor rains through January 
and will have below average crops. How much below average will depend 
on the quality of the February and potential March/April rains.
Estimation of grain import needs is complicated by the substitutability 
of cassava which is a standby famine averting crop in some areas. The 
lowest prudent estimate of the drought related additional grain (maize) 
deficit is 250,000 tonnes (versus a normal year balance or small 
surplus in maize and 50,000 to 100,000 tonnes of wheat and rice
imports). Late rain failure in the North and Lake Zones and petering 
out of February rains in the South could raise that to 500,000 tonnes.
At least half the physical food requirement will be to replace rural 
grain in cities - especially Dar es Salaam but also Morogoro, Mbeya and 
Mtwara. The balance will be needed as drought relief in the worst 
affected rural districts for between 500,000 and 2,000,000 persons.
Both Dar es Salaam and Mtwara have substantial usable surplus capacity 
as do the Tazara rail and the Dar es Salaam and Mtwara access highways 
to the Centre and South. Past drought (and flood experience) 
demonstrates an adequate institutional system for delivering survival 
food aid at village or sub-district level and a high political priority 
to making sure it works. Food for work (in kind or cash) capacity is 
more limited and the potential for raising it sharply on short notice 
highly problematic.
Tanzania's fiscal and external balance positions are precarious.
Further over a quarter of the recurrent budget and three fifths of 
imports are aid financed. Therefore food aid of at least 250,000 
tonnes above normal levels is required.
Lesotho
Lesotho has had disastrous weather. Its main grain growing areas 
adjoin Orange Free State districts reporting complete crop wipe out.
The normal grain import requirement is of the order of 200,000 tonnes 
including wheat and rice. The additional 1992-93 requirement is likely 
to be of the order of 100,000 tonnes. Normal non-food aid purchases 
from South Africa are likely to continue to be available (out of re­
exports) and are largely paid for out of mining and other labour 
remittances both at national and household levels. The number of 
persons requiring food relief or enrollment in food for work programmes 
may rise by 250,000.
Because Lesotho is an enclave imports must transit South Africa. The 
logical port - Durban - may well be clogged with South African grain 
imports forcing use of the more distant Grahamstown and/or East London. 
SATs rail and road capacity for port - Lesotho movement is probably
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adequate. Lesotho has substantial rations and food for work experience 
which is effective in averting famine if not, perhaps, very leak proof.
Lesotho has a precarious budgetary and external balance position and 
will need on the order of 100,000 tonnes additional food aid.
8. Swaziland
Swaziland grain crops are poor - though not completely wiped out at 
least in the Middle and High Veldt zones. In good years Swaziland has 
an approximate balance in maize production and use and in normal a 
deficit of up to 100,000 tonnes. The 1992-93 additional requirement 
may be of the order of 100,000 tonnes and the additional non-South 
African (normal supplier) requirement 150,000 tonnes. At least partial 
food aid or food for work may be needed by up to 100,000 persons.
The Port of Maputo has a very large surplus effective capacity so that
150,000 tonnes could be landed. The Manzini-Maputo rail line could 
carry that tonnage subject to security conditions. The logical South 
African port - Richard's Bay - is bulk cargo oriented but for coal and 
mineral exports not grain imports. Durban is likely to be clogged by 
South Africa's own grain imports while East London, Grahamstown and 
Capetown are uneconomically far away. Internal distribution logistics 
in Swaziland should pose few problems - relief or food for work 
institutional capacity is more problematic.
Swaziland's fiscal and external balance positions are precarious and 
the drought will worsen both. Therefore, substantial food aid will be 
required.
9. Botswana
Botswana has entered another of its biblical drought cycles. This will 
increase its normal grain import needs of 200,000-250,000 tonnes to 
300,000-400,000. The normal source - South Africa - cannot be counted 
on to maintain, let along raise, exports because it has a huge maize 
deficit of its own. However, on past performance it will seek to 
preserve its Botswana market by re-exporting. A minimum of 100,000 and 
a maximum of 250,000 tonnes will need to be brought in other than 
from/via South Africa.
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The evident route is via Walvis Bay/Namibia. Port capacity and rail 
capacity to Windhoek (and perhaps Gobabis) iB adequate. Road haulage 
has built up rapidly since Namibia's independence, though portions of 
the Windhoek-Gaborone 'highway' are of very poor quality. Botswana is 
seeking to reopen its use of Maputo and might wish (and be able) to 
handle a portion of the imports via the Maputo - Resano Garcia line and 
the SATs net. Internal delivery systems both logistically and 
institutionally (work for food plus school and health centre based 
supplementary food provision) are fully adequate. In practice the 
latter serve virtually all rural households and the former all self 
selected, low wage seeking households.
Botswana doubtless will seek and receive some food aid. However, $25 
million to $40 million of import and distribution costs can, in fact, 
be covered by its own budgetary and foreign exchange resources if 
necessary.
10. Namibia
Namibia's weather has been uneven. The main grain growing (and African 
household farm) area in the Northcentral zone has had reasonable rains 
and water flows from the Angolan plateau. The Northeastern Caprivi 
zone seems likely to have had a bad year as both Southern Zambia and 
Southeastern Angola report crop failures. Central and Southern Namibia 
have had very poor rains which will have affected commercial, 
mechanised maize production.
The additional food import requirement is somewhat problematic - 
perhaps 50,000 tonnes (half for livestock consumption). In addition up 
to 100,000 tonnes of normal commercial imports from South Africa may 
need to be resourced. Most of this will be for urban sale. Persons 
loosing entitlements may be as low as 15,000 (Caprivians) unless 
commercial farms/ranches radically reduce employment. No evident 
logistical difficulties exist - this magnitude of swing in import 
levels is normal and of the affected areas only Caprivi is hard to 
reach.
Namibia will need additional food aid of at least 25,000 tonnes. The 
fiscal and external account positions are barely satisfactory at levels 
which are barely consistent with acceptable (4 per cent or above)
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output and public service provision growth and 1992 export prospects 
for some key minerals (especially uranium oxide) and for meat (drought 
impact) are poor to problematic.
11. Angola
Most of Angola is not drought affected. However the Southeast quadrant 
(UNITA controlled) is. Further the legacy of war means that there is 
an underlying pre-drought import requirement (even if one not fully met 
in past years) of at least 750,000 to 1,000,000 tonnes. The drought 
uplift is perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes.
Logistical problems are very severe. Even with peace, rail, road, 
bridge and vehicle fleet capacity is very limited. While the grain can 
be landed at Luanda, Lubito and Mocamedes movement upcountry is 
problematic. This problem is exacerbated by a de facto patchwork quilt 
layout of Government and UNITA controlled areas. In the case of the 
Southeast this may posit continuation/augmentation of shipments landed 
at Walvis Bay and carried across Namibia by lorry. On past experience 
that route could be expanded to up to 200,000 tonnes.
Angola could perhaps cover 500,000-750,000 tonnes of commercial imports 
($75-125 million) financed from oil export and tax revenues freed by 
the advent of peace. It could not cover 900,000 to 1,150,000 except at 
the price of severe cutbacks on infrastructural and public service 
restoration needed to heal the civil and political as well as the 
economic wounds of war. Further at least 200,000 to 250,000 tonnes of 
the deficit is in UNITA controlled areas and UNITA has very limited 
civil import capacity. Therefore a 1992-93 food aid level of 400,000 
to 500,000 tonnes would be appropriate, especially from states setting 
high priority on a continued transition to peace and reconciliation in 
Angola.
Regional Summary
The total additional food import requirements are of the order of
10,000,000 to 11,000,000 tonnes. Between 20,000,000 and 26,000,000 
additional persons have suffered major or total entitlements loss from 
drought and require either relief rations or food for work programmes. 
Realistically, in the time available, such programmes cannot be expanded to
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include the majority of recipients except in Botswana and possibly Zimbabwe 
and Lesotho which have substantial past and/or present programmes.
The landed cost of the grain (at say $175 cif per tonne - aid agency 
accounting prices) would be over $1,750 million and that of transport to 
landlocked states, domestic transport and distribution of the order of $500 
million plus non-food costs of food for work programmes for the entitlement 
restoration component. The bulk of this expenditure in Southern Africa 
needs to be met by donors (with the possible exception of Botswana and, 
partially, Angola). In the case of South Africa special constraints 
mandating complete reliance on non-government channels apply and the bulk 
of the requirement is for purchase by still entitled consumers and for 
livestock.
Logistically problems are severe but largely manageable if port and main 
road/rail link capacity is deployed on a coordinated regional basis and 
additional road vehicles/spares provided to countries with particularly 
inadequate lorry pools and import capacity (e.g. Mozambique and, probably, 
Zambia).
The institutional capacity for distribution is uneven but substantial. In 
South Africa where the assistance cannot be channelled through the state, 
base level civil society NGOs exist but national coordinating and delivery 
capacity is, at present, totally inadequate. Elsewhere unevenly strong 
state, domestic NGO and external NGO structures with not insignificant 
capacity built up over a bitter decade of experience exist. The political 
priority given to maintaining food security and averting famine is 
significant everywhere (with one possible exception) and is particularly 
high in Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
Food aid requirements to avert famine - albeit not to prevent an increase 
in hunger - total 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 tonnes. At $175 aid agency cif 
plus $100 tonne transport from ports plus distribution the cost is of the 
order of $1,100 to $1,375 million. Together with possible additional 
commercial imports of 5,000,000 tonnes (of which over 4,000,000 to South 
Africa) this would reduce the grain equivalent deficit to the order of
1,000,000 tonnes. The reduction may appear large but it is against the 
background of poor nutrition levels for several countries and for the 
bottom 40 per cent of the population in all except, perhaps, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana. At the bottom extreme in Mozambique and Angola pre drought food
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availability was of the order of 75 per cent of basic requirements overall 
and probably under 70 per cent in all rural areas taken together. Levels 
below 70 per cent are usually interpreted as indicating famine or near 
famine conditions so that any further significant reduction in these two 
countries is perilously likely to cause mass starvation. The Swahili 
proverb "Give a fat man less food and he will grow thin; give a thin man 
less food and he will die" is only too literally apposite to these 
countries.
Peace, Politics, Macroeconomics and Famine
The very real probability that failure to meet the food supply disaster can 
lead to over 500,000 human beings dying in widely spread famine zones, 
including peri urban "shanty towns" and "squatter settlements" should be 
enough reason to focus attention on meeting the basic requirements.
Allowing avoidable deaths on that scale diminishes the whole world 
community.
But beyond that imperative there are narrower cogent reasons for not 
standing by. When Nassav Senior argued that the only problem with 19th 
Century Irish potato blight famines were that they did not kill enough 
people to restore viability to the Irish economy, not only the hardness of 
his heart but the softness of his head could be challenged.
Famine will endanger peace processes in Angola, Mozambique and South 
Africa. Starving men with guns - whether rebels or soldiers - are 
virtually certain to ensure that food for them flows from the barrels of 
their guns. The price is unlikely to be limited to murdered farmers, 
destroyed food lorries and sacked warehouses. It is likely to rekindle 
Civil War (not necessarily on the former cleavage lines) in Angola and to 
plunge much of rural Mozambique into a truly Hobbesian war of all against 
all. In South Africa - with its massive and massively visible inequality - 
the enemies of the Codesa process (including the poor white supporters of 
the far right) would almost certainly gain the power to destroy it. True, 
people who are actually starving are rarely able to wage war or massively 
destabilising violence - even civil war - but those who fear their turn to 
die will come next and have access to weapons do have that power.
If the advent of or transition to open, pluralist, democratic politics is 
paralleled by the advent of famine levels unknown for fifty years, the
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consequences are not predictable in detail but none of the plausible 
scenarios are pretty. Any new government is in danger of being swept away; 
any old is likely to feel forced (whatever its own inclinations) to 
'tighten up' in the face of very real threats to social and political order 
as well as to itself. Capacity building will be off the agenda and the 
maintenance of even minimal civil governance capacity the topical issue.
The macroeconomic results will also be convulsive. In the South and 
Southern African contexts, food scarcity will lead to food price fuelled 
inflation and thence to the collapse of semi floated approaches to foreign 
exchange. Either the rates will fall like rocks, the discrepancy between 
first and second window rates will broaden rapidly and/or there will be a 
reversion to administrative allocation. Further the fiscal consequences on 
both revenue and expenditure (assuming some attempt to provide relief to 
the drought relief without external backing) will almost certainly reduce 
progress toward balanced recurrent and both longer and more suitably 
financed capital budgets. Further the political context will be one highly 
propitious, not for rational political economic discourse (right, centre or 
left; structural adjustment, transformation and/or rehabilitation) but for 
















South Africa 6,000,000 - 6,000,000 4,000,000-7,000,00010 800,000-1,400,0001S
Zimbabwe 1,250,000-2,000,0002 - 1,250,000-2,000,000 4,000,000-5,000,000 750,000
Mozambique 875,0003 150,000s 1,025,000 4,500,00011 875,0003
Malawi 400,000 - 400,000 3,000,000 400,000
Zambia 500,000-750,000* 100,000-150,000 600,000-900,000 2,000,000-3,000,000* 500,000
Tanzania 250,000-500,0005 - 250,000-500,000 500,000-2,000,000“ 250,000-500,000
Lesotho 100,000 - 100,000 250,000 100,000
Swaziland 100,000 50,000 150,000 100,000 75,000-100,000
Botswana 100,000-150,000 25,000-100,000 125,000-250,000 300,000 50,000
Namibia 50,000 50,000-100,000 100,000-150,000 15,000-50,000ia 25,000
Angola 100,000-150,000s - 100,000-150,000 1,500,000s 200,000-250,000ls
Total 9,725,000 375,000 10,100,000 20,165,000 4,025,000
11,175,000 550,000 11,725,000 26,700,000 4,950,000
Table derived from text based on mosaic of WFP, UNICEF, SADCC, National
Government and press reports.
1. Additional imports required for pre drought importers and total imports 
required for pre drought exporters. Tonnages are grain equivalent of 
estimated national food deficits caused by drought.
2. See text. 1,250,000 appears more likely.
3. Midpoint of range. See Annex.
4. Uncertainty as to Western Zambia affects estimate.
5. Possible late rain impact significant.
6. Very tentative. Assumes limited drought losses outside Southeast 
quadrant.
7. Previous South African or Zimbabwe sourced imports unlikely to be 
available in 1992-93.
8. Includes 75,000-100,000 triangular food aid from Zimbabwe; 50,000-
75,000 parallel market imports from South Africa and Zimbabwe.
9. Loss of household self provisioning food, agricultural cash sales, 
agricultural cash ('casual' or wage) employment plus loss of wage and 
self employment income from commercial and other urban sectors affected 
by drought damage to rural purchasing power. Estimate is of households 
whose entitlements are severely reduced and pushed well below absolute 
poverty line. Largely excludes second round effects of higher food 
prices.
10. Rural component 2,000,000-3,000,000; dorp (small town) 750,000- 
1,250,000; urban and peri-urban 1,250,000-2,750,000. Last figure 
highly approximate because urban drift and general economic stagnation 
trend effects almost impossible to separate fully from drought impact.
11. Includes affectados (war displaced persons not receiving food relief) 
and other severely war affected rural sector familial households whose 
limited output will be severely drought damaged as well as more stable 
sector familial farming households and commercial agriculture employee 
households.
12. Caprivian farming households plus commercial farm/ranch and related 
commercial sector employees and households only.
13. Excludes import requirement other than for human consumption and - 
where plausible - financeable additional commercial imports.
14. Capacity constraint problem severe given unsuitability of Government 
channels. See text.
15. Higher than strict drought relief estimate because Angola has in the 
past received disproportionately low food aid and because additional 
flows to a UNITA controlled area without parallel expansion of flows 





i TOWARD REGIONAL LOGISTICAL PROGRAMMING
For logistics review purposes, South Africa and Southern Africa can - with 
one potential exception - be treated as two regions. South Africa is most 
unlikely to have port or rail capacity for substantial transit grain 
traffic to its neighbours. The exception - which will be explored below - 
is that for the Northern and Eastern Transvaal the logical port is Maputo 
and not merely transport costs but congestion at Durban could be reduced 
substantially by its use.
The logical port for Natal, the Orange Free State and the Southern and
Western Transvaal is Durban which probably has the capacity to handle their 
additional requirements efficiently. Grahamstown and East London can 
handle the Eastern Cape requirements relatively easily as can Cape Town for 
the balance of the Cape.
The problem is the Northern and Eastern Transvaal requirements (up to
2,000,000 tonnes if one includes much of the Vaal Triangle around
Johannesburg). Durban does not have the capacity to handle them
effectively while the other three ports are unsatisfactorily far away. The 
logical entrance route is via Maputo which up to the mid-1970s handled up 
to the order of 10,000,000 tonnes of South African cargo a year versus at 
most a tenth of that level today.
The Port of Maputo could handle up to 1,5000,000 tonnes of grain for South 
Africa in addition to portions of Mozambican, Zimbabwean, Swati and 
Botswanan requirements. In principle so could the short Resano Garcia rail 
line to South Africa. However, that line is a prime target for attacks by 
the bandidos armados of Renamo which radically reduce its effective 
capacity. If it could be declared an "island of peace" by the Government 
and Renamo and SATs cooperated in emergency rehabilitation the grain could
be moved. The Government of Mozambique and SATs would probably welcome




The Southern African import requirements are apparently handleable at port 
and main rail and highway link levels (Table 2). However, for that 
adequacy in principle to become adequacy in practice will requires
a. reviewing the initial estimated capacity levels especially in respect 
to highway routes;
b. identifying additional lorry, lorry spare and railway traction power 
constraints which could be met by deliveries prior to the end of 1992;
c. coordinating use of routes at governmental, national emergency/relief
institution, transport enterprise and donor levels. SATCC (Southern 
African Transport and Communications Council) and its committee of 
railways and the Food Security Sector of SADCC (Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference) should be in a position to provide 
forums for and play a catalytic role in regional coordination;
d. once aid levels and sources are negotiated then negotiate a firm
coordinated recipient/source schedule of deliveries which is held to 
because the capacity levels assume full time operation on schedule not 
a slow build-up followed by surges and troughs.
The key elements to be fitted together are seven ports: Maputo, Beira,
Nacala in Mozambique, Dar es Salaam and Mtwara in Tanzania, Walvis Bay in 
Namibia (under transitional joint management with South Africa) and Lobito 
in Angola taken together with ten rail and/or road corridors, plus one 
coastal transhipment operation, fanning out from them.
Two other ports - Tanga in Tanzania and Luanda in Angola - are not directly 
relevant to drought related additional imports. In principle, some normal 
Dar es Salaam imports could be switched to Mtwara to free capacity for 
grain but this appears unlikely to be necessary. Luanda should be handling 
more grain imports for Central and Northern Angola but these relate to the 




























































































1. Capacity is estimated present effective unused capacity. For ports dry 
cargo excluding ore and coal facilities. For railway road-bed, rolling % 
stock, traction power. For roads road-bed, surface, bridges only, not 
including lorry fleet.
2. Country of destination. Except for Zimbabwe and Mozambique computed on
maximum requirement from Table 1. For Zimbabwe 1,250,000 tonnes used 
because 2,000,000 tonne estimate appears too high (see Section II 
Text). For Mozambique top of range estimate of 1,000,000 tonnes crop 
loss (see Annex) used, not 875,000 of Table 1.
3. Very cautious estimate. However, as with other ports, most grain would
need to be bagged or unloaded by grab and bagged in the port.
4. Rail corridor to Zimbabwe.
5. Rail corridor to South Africa.
6. The 2,000,000 tonne figure (and 1,000,000 tonne allocation to shipments
to South Africa) is relevant if Renamo (with South African pressure)
halts attacks on this line by the bandidos armados. If SATs also 
carries out emergency rehabilitation an extra 500,000 tonnes of South 
African imports could perhaps be handled.
7. Domestic road, rail link capacity - rough estimate. May require
additional lorries.
8. Rail Corridor to Manica and - by road connection - Tete Provinces and 
to Zimbabwe and Zambia. Assumes security situation consistent with 
night train operation. Can be augmented by highway use up to perhaps
100,000 tonnes if Zimbabwe and Zambia lorries available including those 
previously transporting Zimbabwean grain exports to Mozambique and 
Malawi.
9. Domestic road, rail link capacity. Rough estimate. May require
additional lorries.
10. Includes transhipment (via quay or direct) capacity.
11. Rail line to Nampula and Niasa provinces and rail/road line to Malawi 
via Intralagos. May be tighter traction power constraint at present.
12. Road capacity. Relates to Eastern Nampula and Northern Zambesia 
provinces. Does require additional lorries.
13. Transhipment to secondary (Quelimane, Pemba, perhaps Inhambane) and 
tertiary (e.g. Mocimba, Xai Xai, Angoche) Mozambican ports.
14. Rail line to Zambia with road link to Malawi.
15. Domestic road and rail routes. Rough estimate. Probably requires 
additional lorries.
16. Assumes Malawi wishes to use Tanzania ports as well as Nacala or faces 
a highway connecting link capacity constraint on the latter.
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17. To Southern Tanzania and Malawi. Probably requires additional lorries.
18. Under interim arrangements between Namibia and South Africa. Very 
rough additional usable capacity estimated based on facilities plus 
past peak use.
19. Assumes most shipment to Southeast quadrant of Angola transit Namibia 
for ease of transport and political pluralism reasons.
20. Luanda also has surplus capacity but the drought appears to be 
localised in the South. If peace reallocation of oil export proceeds 
and additional food aid permit up to 400,000 tonnes additional grain 
imports beyond the drought related ones would be highly desirable - 
perhaps 200,000 tonnes each Luanda and Lobito.
21. May include rail to Huambo if rehabilitated/operational as of late 
1992. Both rail and road require additional equipment.
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Mozambique Range - Maputo, Beira, Nacala
Maputo can move 1,600,000 tonnes of additional grain imports - preferably 
bagged - for Mozambique (400,000), Zimbabwe (1,000,000), Swaziland
(150.000) and Botswana (50,000). The key constraints are the low effective 
capacity of the largely unrehabilitated Limpopo Valley rail line to 
Zimbabwe, attacks by the bandidos armados of Renamo on the lines to South 
Africa (linking on to the Zimbabwe system) and to Swaziland the limited 
lorry fleet on domestic road routes which are also subject to attack.
As discussed above, if South Africa cooperates in using its influence to 
halt Renamo attacks on the Resano Garcia line to South Africa then
1,000,000 tonnes of grain destined for South Africa could transit Maputo. 
With South African Transport Services (SATs), emergency assistance on 
repairs on that line this could be pushed to 1,500,000 tonnes before the 
Maputo Port capacity became binding assuming reliably scheduled and 
relatively evenly spaced arrivals of vessels.
Beira could handle 850,000 tonnes - again preferably bagged - additional 
grain for Mozambique (350,000), Zimbabwe (250,000) and Zambia (250,000). 
While cargo for Malawi could use the route via Zimbabwe, the easier access 
to Nacala, Dar es Salaam and Mtwara and - especially - the probably 750,000 
tonne additional haulage limit on the Beira-Zimbabwe (Chimoio) rail line 
point to its use of those ports rather than Biera.
The rail haulage expansion posited assumes that the improved security 
conditions in the Beira Corridor will allow night trains and that to the 
extent Mozambican Railways traction power is inadequate National Railways 
of Zimbabwe can fill the gap. The domestic road haulage capacity available 
depends heavily on expansion of the lorry fleet and on security conditions 
(food lorries, especially when not in armed convoys, are soft targets and 
convoy movement reduces capacity).
Nacala could move 800,000 tonnes to Mozambique (350,000) and Malawi
(350.000). In fact the port could probably handle rather more but would 
then have no means to forward it to additional drought afflicted areas.
The level of throughput posited assumes 250,000 tonnes of cargo for 
secondary and tertiary Mozambican ports is transhipped from large ocean 
going vessels to smaller ones, coasters and self-docking craft at Nacala 
which is equipped for and has experience in such transhipment.
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The major constraint on use of Nacala at this level is likely to be the 
unrehabilitated gap in the rail line to Malawi for about 200 km before the 
Mozambique/Malawi border. Traffic is moving rail-road-rail but a 
substantial build-up will be needed. There may also be a traction power 
constraint. Niasa province - previously supplied to a significant extent 
from Malawi and/or Zimbabwe via Malawi can be reached by rail using the 
Lichinga extension.
As discussed earlier an "islands of peace" agreement for food carrying 
vehicles, the infrastructure they use and warehouses/distribution points 
between the Government and Renamo would significantly increase transit and 
- especially - domestic forwarding and distribution capacity. If this can 
be achieved the drought - or more accurately the drought relief - could 
have a positive impact on the peace process both at the Santa Egida talks 
in Rome and - even more - on the ground in Mozambique.
Tanzania Range — Dar es Salaam, Mtwara
Dar es Salaam can readily handle 9250,000 tonnes additional grain imports 
for Tanzania (400,000), Zambia (500,000) and Malawi (25,000) - again with 
the caveat that most of it will be needed to be bagged or off-loaded with 
grabs and bagged in the port area. Tazara railway has adequate capacity 
for the Southbound grain (it tends to have an imbalance of Northbound 
cargo) through to Mbeya for distribution in Southern Tanzania and transfer 
to highway transport to Malawi and on by rail to Katima Molilo and the 
Zambian Railway system. (The latter's capacity to move most of the grain 
on to the Copperbelt, Lusaka and Livingstone is more problematic.) The 
domestic rail and road capacity to Central and Southwestern Tanzania is 
more problematic with additional lorries probably required.
Mtwara (like Nacala a deep water natural port with substantial, but 
substantially unused, facilities) can handle 125,000 tonnes of grain to 
Tanzania (100,000) and Malawi (25,000). In this case the main highway to 
the interior has more capacity, the constraint on moving grain to Southern 
Tanzania by that route is lorries.
The Atlantic Range — Walvis Bay, Lobito
I
Walvis Bay - in transition to becoming Namibian - can readily cope with
350,000 tonnes of additional grain for Namibia (50,000), Angola (100,000)
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and Botswana (200,000). It may have relatively more spare bulk unloading 
and storage capacity than the other ports. So far as Windhoek the main 
rail line can carry the cargo. The Botswana traffic could - in part - 
continue by rail to Gobabis but would need to be transferred to lorries 
there and/or at Windhoek. While many parts of the Trans Kalahari 'highway' 
are very poor, they are passable for lorries and both Botswana and Namibia 
have relatively adequate lorry fleets.
For Angola transfer to lorries would need to take place at Windhoek for 
transport on the highway to Otjihase and Rundu. This route has been used 
for earlier food relief traffic and is adequate at least to the Angolan 
border. The Caprivi Strip in Namibia lies at the end of another highway 
link. While in principle it could better be served from Livingstone in 
Zambia or Bulawayo in Zimbabwe (via Fraincistown, Botswana) that is 
probably impracticable in the 1992-93 drought context.
Lobito is the logical major port for Southwestern and Southcentral Angola. 
It should be able to handle 50,000 tonnes of drought related (and perhaps 
up to 250,000 tonnes pre-existing hunger related) additional grain. Onward 
transport capacity depends largely on the pace of rail and lorry stock 
rehabilitation since the end of the Civil War.
General
This sketch suggests that - especially in respect to port capacity - 
Southern Africa can receive its own food shipments directly. Low demand 
growth, rehabilitation and modest expansion since the early 1980s have 
created a substantial effective unused capacity. However, bulk handling 
and in-port bagging capacity are limited so that, if large shipments of 
grain are to be made in bulk, assistance in respect to grab off-loading and 
port area bagging capacity (both of which involve relatively off-the-shelf, 
swiftly installable plant and machinery) would be needed.
The rail route position is somewhat less uniformly positive. In Mozambique 
rehabilitation needs severely limit capacity of the direct line from Maputo 
to Zimbabwe and force transhipment on the Nacala-Malawi line. Security 
problems limit effective capacity of the lines from Maputo to South Africa 
and to Swaziland. In Tanzania, Zambia and Angola effective domestic 
railway capacity (except for Tazara which is basically an international
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route) is low relative both to past actual and present nominal levelb and 
shows little sign of sustained recovery.
In the case of road transport, the highway position is uneven and 
unsatisfactory but - at least at interstate level - a less serious 
constraint than lorry shortages. These are endemic in Mozambique,
Tanzania, Zambia and Angola suggesting that additional vehicles should 
accompany additional food aid. The South African drought may put pressure 
on the lorry fleet there causing withdrawal of some South African owned 
vehicles from services to/in Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia. The 
key factor is speed of delivery and of bringing into operation. This is 
consistent with private sector operation if - and only if - rapid 
enterprise indentification and hire-purchase agreement negotiation is 
practicable or if the relevant private operators are NGOs.
The tonnages allocated in Table 2 are the maximum additional needs from 
outside the region listed in Table 1 with two exceptions. For Zimbabwe
1.250.000 tonnes has been used because, as discussed above, a 2,000,000 
tonne estimate appears somewhat unlikely. In the absence of rapid progress 
on Limpopo Valley line rehabilitation or a Government -Renamo truce on the 
Resano Garcia line the maximum regional capacity to Zimbabwe is 1,500,000 
tonnes. Even that would be problematic if Zambia's requirements are at the 
top end of the 500,000-750,000 tonne range because while the port of Dar es 
Salaam could handle the 250,000 tonnes of Zambian grain tentatively listed 
as via Beira Tazara and/or Zambian Railways probably could not. While road 
haulage would be possible so far as the highway links are concerned, very 
substantial lorry fleet additions would be required.
For Mozambique a 1,000,000 tonne top of range drought loss estimate and a
250.000 tonne shift from neighbouring country to extra-regional sources has 
been used. The 250,000 tonne figure is used because of very considerable 
uncertainty as to border traffic in grain.
This exercise is preliminary or prolegomenonic. It does however 
demonstrate the possibility of a Southern African logistical solution and 
provide a basis for a more detailed logistical planning exercise.
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IV.
THE REGIONAL ASPECT: SADCC, SATCC POTENTIAL poT.RS
Southern Africa's ten states coordinate selected sectoral policies, 
operations and projects through their regional organisation - SADCC. Two 
of its strongest sectoral units are in Transport (SATCC) and Food Security. 
In the early 1980s drought cycle - and particularly in 1984 - SADCC played 
a significant role in respect to presenting country and regional data and 
national proposals to mobilise support both for short term survival relief 
and longer term vulnerability reduction. Since that date the coordinated 
national/regional early warning system has been completed and has played a 
role in the provision of the data demonstrating the scope and severity of 
the 1991-92 drought.
The SADCC Food Security Unit (located in Harare, while SATCC is based in 
Maputo and SADCC Headquarters in Gaborone) has been collecting and 
analysing data. By February it had and publicised a regional overview 
which made plain the disastrous crop situation, the impending famine and 
the need for prompt action. There is reason to believe action by SADCC, 
SADCC-FS and SATCC could play several useful roles in mobilising and 
coordination to secure grain, get it to the afflicted countries and avert 
mass famine.
A triangular approach by the Headquarters, Food Security and SATCC 
coordinated with the actions of SADCC's Member States might prove most 
effective:
a. Food Security to complete first revise of regional preliminary drought 
and food deficit study and secure data from countries on needed phasing 
of food arrivals between April 1992 and March 1993 based on opening 
stocks, pipeline, estimated harvest and requirements;
b. In parallel SATCC to secure data from Member State Ministries of 
transport and their rail and port enterprises on effective additional 
port, rail and highway capacity available by route, more tentative data 
on road haulage fleet capacity and specific citation of any bottlenecks 
which can realistically be broken before the end of 1992;
c. SADCC-SATCC-Food Security hold meeting of Member States and transport 
enterprises to agree on tentative route capacity allocation pattern for
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I the region in respect to drought impact reduction additional food 
imports to be worked out in more detail by a subsequent working meeting 
of national food security units, main importing enterprises and key 
transporters (including major inter-state road hauliers as well as port 
and railway corporations);
d. In parallel Food Security would update its information on requirements
and forward it to the SATCC groups;
e. While SADCC would undertake such profile presenting and resource
mobilisation exercises as its Member States desired possibly including 
a high level team to visit donor capitals and/or a regional workshop 
presentation to donor representatives either in Southern Africa or in 
Europe and almost certainly including a SATCC-Transport Enterprise- 
National Food Security unit regional workshop to agree a destination 
and timing schedule for food aid arrivals consistent with using 
available transport capacity effectively to avert famine.
This sketch of possible action is quite consistent with SADCC's goals to 
act in cases of mutual interest mutually agreed on by its members and to do 
so in sectors and on topics in which coordinated action was likely to be 
more effective than separate, uncoordinated national initiatives. It would 
make use of SADCC1s information collection, analytical, contact and 
negotiating skills while leaving actual goal setting and operations in 
national hands. In reBpect to the interstate logistical issues, it would 
appear that a SATCC catalytic role is a necessary condition for effective 
allocation of capacity over the Indian Ocean port and corridor range to 
ensure that all basic national landing and onward dispatch requirements can 
be met.
V.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? WHEN?
To warn that no tocsin has been sounded and no sense of urgency and 
priority created in the bilateral donor community (or even in some of the 
affected countries) is not to assert nothing has been done. Indeed were 
that true the situation would indeed be hopeless.
Most of the eleven countries have substantial data and some analysis in 
hand. In some cases there are several independent (and not always
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compatible) sources. For most there are national, WFP and FAO preliminary
assessments and presumably UNDP ones for countries in which it has had a
substantial food aid coordinating role. However:
a. it is not clear that the national Food Security institutions and UNDP- 
WFP-FAO have formally met together to reconcile and synthesize their 
findings at country level;
b. country analysis is - at least in some cases - proceeding on a 
"business as usual" basis seeking to collect more data from districts 
and provinces and to have a final result before going public. Thatmay 
be admirable in a normal year but it is less appropriate to an 
impending disaster whose reality and parameters are in little doubt 
even if details are either unknown or — at this point in time — 
unknowable;
c. central economic ministries (finance and planning) do not seem to have 
been made uniformly aware of the magnitude of the fiscal and foreign 
exchange costs of averting disaster nor of how fast time to forestall - 
rather than merely to alleviate - famine is running out;
d. outside WFP, UNICEF and - perhaps less uniformly - UNDP and the World 
Bank, international and bilateral potential funders appear effectively 
unaware of the sheer scope of the physical and financial challenge and 
of the need for urgent action. They may well have been informed, but 
neither the tenor nor the content of the communications has been 
adequate to focus their attention;
e. more general publicity has been very uneven and scattered. The most 
considered and broadest in coverage appears to have been that of the 
SADCC Food Security Unit while the most urgently worded national 
statements have been by Zimbabwe. Unfortunately neither scattered 
articles nor conflicting statements from different sources (or the same 
source at brief intervals) are effective in creating a climate of 
public, overall governmental or donor community concerned opinion 
adequate to tackle the challenge of averting famine;
f. no coordinated logistical planning to utilise the ports and transport 
corridors of the SADCC region appears to have been begun and statements
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that the appropriate route is Durban may lead logistical planning by 
donors down a dead end desert canyon.
The recurring weakness of international drought relief and famine avoidance 
efforts in the past two decades - not only in Southern Africa - has been 
underestimation of the scope of the problem long after data were available 
followed by delay in putting responses together until only a bureaucratic 
and logistic miracle and air-lifting hundreds of thousands of tonnes of 
grain from the North literally to camps and villages could have prevented 
famine. Unfortunately evidence on poor crops even together flow charts on 
when stocks plus reduced harvests plus pipeline flows will run out do not 
have the same impact either on the general public, or on food aid officials 
and the politicians to whom they are responsible, as do TV images of 
starving children. By the time those are on screen the battle to avert 
famine is lost and only partial amelioration of its deadly impact is 
possible. There is still time to use to build on the data and analysis 
already undertaken in the sobering prism of past efforts to yield more 
satisfactory results for the millions of human beings at riBk in South and 
Southern Africa. Just enough time to use but none to waste.
A critical path for Southern Africa might include:
1. national quick review of own data/analysis with country UNDP-WFP-FAO- 
UNICEF offices leading to an immediate, forceful alert to potential 
donors and the international press by the beginning of April;
2. collection-checking-analyis of basic data on crop losses and food 
balance shortfalls (nationally and by province) leading to a report of 
physical food aid and immediately suppliable logistic inputs plus 
finances for domestic distribution requirements which cannot be met 
domestically to go to donors, SADCC, SATCC by mid-April;
3. a meeting of Member States (including central economic, transport and
food security units) with SADCC/SATCC leading to agreement on SADCC's
information and mobilisation roles and on SATCC's responsibility to 
develop a coordinated logistical plan by the end of April;
4. continued data collection and analysis review to correct, articulate
and update;
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5. on the basis of all available data, Southern African States to 
negotiate with Donors bilaterally, but preferably on a coordinated 
basis - ideally at a joint meeting of States and Major Donors either in 
the Southern African region or in Europe perhaps with SADCC serving as 
a joint secretariat to its ten members in May;
6. agreement on the levels and timing of assistance followed by immediate 
technical logistical meetings of Donor, State and SATCC officials to 
agree on an operational routing and timing programme by early June;
7. procurement and dispatch of initial shipments during June and July;
8. arrival in Southern Africa and forwarding to main cities of destination 
and thence to rural areas over August/September;
9. review of progress and of new developments on an ongoing basis - 
primarily at operational level beginning in September;
10. continuation of the programme through the 1992-93 harvest over the 
period February-July (depending on country) and
11. preliminary assessment of 1992-93 probable harvest and food balance 
position involving the ten countries, WFP-FAO-UNDP-UNICEF, SADCC and 
bilateral donors in January 1993 to determine whether a further 1993-94 
programme will be necessary.
The date on which stocks, 1992 harvest intake and pipeline shipments of 
grain will run out is a key one. It is likely to range from 
August/September 1992 in Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe 
through September/October in Mozambique (though possibly August in Southern 
Mozambique), Malawi, Zambia and Namibia to October/November in Tanzania.
That date is the one by which additional aid (or commercial) grain needs to 
reach urban areas (to substitute for absent national stocks) and to rural 
drought afflicted households - a date at least two months after shipment 
from Europe, North America or the Far East except in the case of main port 
cities.
The cutoff date in 1993 (assuming no 1993-94 emergency programme is needed) 
depends on the harvest date in the country — February/March at the Southern 
end of the range through June/July in northern Tanzania.
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Because since the mid-1970s the weather pattern of the region has shifted 
to several successive good or bad years in succession, it is important that 
the 1993-94 outlook receive a preliminary review in January 1993. 1986-90
was a run of good weather years in most districts of most of the 10 
Southern African countries; 1990-91 was mixed, but a balance below average;
1991-92 is a relatively uniform disaster year except for the two Atlantic 
countries. If 1990-91 marked the entry of a new poor agricultural weather 
cycle, then on the recent past record 1992-93 is likely to be a bad harvest 
year requiring a 1993-94 emergency programme. Evidently this is an 
assumption one hopes will be falsified, but an early review of forecasts 
and crop progress linked to a pre-planning meeting in January 1993 is a low 
cost to pay for two to three extra months to plan responses if the weather 
is indeed bad.






DROPGHT AMD MOZAMBIQUE FOOD 'BALANCE'
Introduction
Mozambique in 'normal' years suffers from a post food aid deficit of 25 per 
cent odd below standard requirements for adequate nutrition. The pre­
import deficit is of the order of 35 per cent. 'Normal' in this sense 
means moderate to favourable crop weather and the 1990 security situation. 
25 per cent average food shortfall is a very serious level while 35 per
cent (65 per average availability) is clear famine.
1990-91 was a mixed year in respect to weather - from good in Cabo Delgado 
to a disastrous drought loss of up to 50 per cent in Manica. 1991-92 is 
uniformly bad to disastrous in the South and Centre and poor to bad in the
North. Probable output loss is of the order of 750,000 to 1,000,000
tonnes. That - at unchanged import levels - would increase the shortfall 
to 40 per cent to over 47 per cent (53 per cent to 60 per cent average 
availability of adequate nutrition). Either is a severe famine level and 
would lead to mass starvation. The projected position is worse than in 
1982 when over 200,000 persons perished from famine.
The only practicable means to augmenting supplies is food aid. Commercial 
imports cannot be raised. Indeed the significant - over 125,000 tonnes and 
conceivably up to 250,000 - quasi legal/informal border imports from South 
Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia are likely to fall sharply since the 
first two countries suffer from crop losses at least as severe as 
Mozambique's and the last two are also in food deficit positions as a 
result of drought.
The Regional situation has further major implications:
a. food aid cannot be sourced from Zimbabwe or Malawi seriously increasing 
the logistical problems of supplying Manica, Tete and Niasa provinces;
b. heavy use of Mozambique's main port and trunk rail facilities will be 
required to meet Zimbabwean and a portion of Zambian, Malawian, Swati 
and - perhaps - Batswanan import requirements;
2c. SADCC (especially Food Security) and SATCC should be used to help
mobilise external support (as they did in the mid-1980s drought cycle)
and to coordinate use of Regional port capacity and access routes to
allow additional import requirements to be off-loaded and forwarded 
expeditiously.
A much higher profile presentation of the impending catastrophe needs to be 
projected and preliminary discussions begun with prospective donors at once 
if the negotiating, routing, scheduling and shipping processes are to be 
completed in time for deliveries over September 1992-March 1993 after 
present stockpile, pipeline and domestic harvest sources have run out. The 
negotiating, scheduling and shipping delays are largely physical and 
bureaucratic and take at least 4 to 6 months before flows eventuate. To 
expect much speedier results is to put faith in achieving a bureaucratic 
miracle - the rarest form of miracle known (or unknown) to humanity.
The security situation poses three special problems in the context of
drought and expanded survival distribution's of food:
1. about 10 per cent of the people are in zones isolated from the rest of 
the country or controlled by the bandidos armados of Renamo and cannot 
at present be served;
2. the bandidos' present strategy of high profile random attacks on 
scattered soft targets will evidently target relief food lorries and 
convoys reducing ability to reach afflicted persons, raising vehicle 
attrition rates and forcing armed escort convoying which increases time 
required per trip and thus the carrying capacity of the vehicle fleet;
3. given the incomplete rehabilitation of the Limpopo Valley line, food 
aid for Zimbabwe would need to transit the Resano Garcia line which 
(with the Maputo-Swaziland line) is, at present, a preferred target of 
the bandidos.
The only evident way of overcoming these barriers to saving life would be 
an "islands of peace" agreement between the Government and Renamo to cover 
survival food shipments, the vehicles and trains in which they moved and 
the railway and highway infrastructure over which they moved plus 
warehouses, depots and distribution points. This would presumably need to 
include shipments to and through areas controlled by the bandidos armados
3of Renamo with internationally monitored distribution to women (who do 
store, process and prepare food) in Renamo controlled areas. For this the 
certainty of some leakage to the bandidos would need to be seen to be 
counterbalanced by the ability to save the lives of more civilians faced 
with famine in Mozambique and in its neighbours.
Basic Food Imbalance
Mozambique probably has a resident population of 12,500,000 odd. The 
projection total of 16,000,000 is reduced by 1,500,000 refugees, 1,000,000 
plus dead as a result of the war and a lower birth rate resulting from 
dislocation. Full nutritional requirements (converted to grain equivalent) 
for that population would be about 4,500,000 tonnes.
Food imports (aid, border informal and quasi legal total of the order of
625.000 tonnes or 14 per cent requirements (say 30 per cent of grain and 40 
per cent of urban nutritional needs). Domestic production can be estimated 
very roughly at 2,750,000 tonnes in a year of normal weather and 1990-91 
security conditions. That leaves a deficit of 1,125,000 tonnes or - on 
average - 25 per cent. That gap appears to be 12| per cent urban and 29 
per cent rural. Arguably the true rural gap is 25 per cent implying 
unrecorded imports from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa of
100.000 to 125,000 tonnes. The high incidences of absolute poverty (30 per 
cent urban and 65 per cent rural) and of moderate and severe child 
malnutrition (over 20 per cent urban and up to 70 per cent in some rural 
districts) corroborate the evidence of a severe national food deficit.
Two points require underlining:
First, Mozambique goes into the 1992-93 famine crisis with serious food 
deficits to the point it is already not far above famine levels (over 30 
per cent shortfalls) so that few belt holes for belt tightening remain;
Second, over 80 per cent of 'normal' food consumption (and over 90 per cent 
in rural areas) comes from domestic sources so that the margin for drought 
losses is greater than would be assumed from images of total present 
reliance on imported grain.
Table 1
'Normal' Food 'Balance' Position 
(tonnes grain equivalent)
Basic Requirement1 4,500,000 (100%)
Domestic Production 2,750,000 (62%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes) 150,000 (3%)
Household Consumed (50,000) (1%)
Commercialised (100,000) (2%)
Rural 2,600,000 (59%)
Household Consumed (2,200,000) (48%)
Commercialised -
Formal and Informal (500,000) (11%)
Imports 625,0002 (13%)
Food Aid (500,000) (11%)
Commercial/Parallel (125,000) (2%)




















(130.000) (12%) 995,000 (29%)'
Based on 12,500,000 population estimate.
Probably understates total imports. May be 125,000 tonnes additional 
border imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi consumed 
in adjoining rural districts or nearby towns. Transborder exports to 
Malawi and Tanzania - not estimated - may be up to 50,000 tonnes.
These are from areas - e.g. Angonia, Northern Mueda Plateau with poor 
transport links with the rest of Mozambique.
Based on 3,000,000 urban and 9,500,000 rural
Intuitively 29% - borderline famine level - appears slightly too high 
(61% of basic nutritional need average availability too low). 125,000 
tonnes of underestimated border area imports consumed in rural areas or 
reducing the actual Mozambican sources sales to towns would lower it to 
the 26% level which seems plausible.
51992-93 Prospect (Portents)
The 1991-92 crop prospects for Mozambique range from poor through 
disastrous to total wipe out. This is fairly clearly the most severe 
drought since independence and quite possibly since the years immediately 
following the First World War.
In three Southern provinces - Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane losses of over 
33 per cent appear certain. Low and erratic rains, higher than average 
temperatures and no appreciable rain in February have made that certain. 
With the harvest actually or virtually in progress future rain would only 
exacerbate losses.
The fourth Southern province - Manica - had a severe drought in 1990-91 and 
has an even worse one in 1991-92. Overall crop losses probably exceed 
50 per cent and may approach 67 per cent with some districts approaching 
100 per cent losses for grain.
Tete province is also suffering from severe drought, albeit possibly 
unevenly and probably less than in 1988. In Sofala, below average and 
erratic rains have at times taken the form of cloud-bursts adding washout 
to drought losses. The overall crop loss is likely to approach 40 per 
cent, higher for grain and lower for root staples. Here too any further 
rains will be too late.
Zambesia and Nampula provinces have been afflicted by drought especially in 
coastal districts. The interior district position is less clear and may be 
less severe. The widespread growing/consumption of cassava provides some 
protection as it is far less drought vulnerable than maize. The possible 
(but by no means certain) damage reduction effects of February (and March) 
showers have yet to be factored into projections but are unlikely to reduce 
losses below 25 per cent. Because of security problems and a historic 
pattern of endemic food shortages in Eastern Nampula, the starting point in 
many districts is so low that any serious reduction in supply threatens 
famine.
Cabo Delgado and Niasa provinces may have had a less disastrous 
weather/agricultural year. The effective word is may because adjacent 
areas of Malawi and Tanzania have been projecting severe drought related 
losses. Further, the value (or otherwise) of February (and March) rain 
showers remains unclear. Because of recent past year grain surpluses and
6inadequate (credit and transport constrained) commercial procurement Cabo 
Delgado probably goes into the 1992-93 harvest season with more stocks 
relative to annual requirements than any other province.
On a low estimate the grain equivalent of drought losses nationally is of 
the order of 750,000 tonnes (about 27.5 per cent of 'normal' output and 
150 per cent of 'normal' food aid deliveries). A high estimate of loss is 
of the order of 1,000,000 tonnes (about 36 per cent of 'normal' output and 
200 per cent of 'normal' food aid).
The end March 1992 stock and import pipeline position also gives cause for 
concern. 1991-92 initial food aid pledges and upward revisions after the 
Manica drought crisis were insufficient to meet needs because of being 
tailored primarily to what "donors would wear" and secondarily to 
distributional bottlenecks. As of December under 40 per cent of the April- 
March pledges had arrived and over 25 per cent had no scheduled arrival 
date at all. Unfortunately - unlike IMF Agreements - food aid agreements 
have no "trigger clauses" for lateness or nonfulfillment of delivery 
commitments.
On a moderately optimistic view of March stocks, 1992 domestic output and 
April-September pipeline arrivals, September 1992 will see unmeetable food 
requirements (at the famine avoidance levels) in the Southern provinces and 
major increases in urban malnutrition. In the Central and Northern 
Provinces the point of total depletion of stocks might come one to two 
months later while the Mueda Plateau and adjoining districts of Cabo 
Delgado and - conceivably - Angonia district of Tete may have later and 
limited needs.
Given the external balance and fiscal positions the only plausible source 
of additional grain (and lorries to move it) is food aid. In respect to 
additional lorries the key issue is not whether DPCCN, AGRICON or the 
private sector are to receive and to operate them but prompt approval, 
shipment and allocation/delivery to allow them to be in use before the end 
of the year. The snag with allocation to private hauliers is that they 
will need hire purchase finance and processing this for 500 or more lorries 
will be excessively time consuming if normal banking channels (even 
Standard Totta albeit they would be speedier than BPD) are used.
Table 2
































1 Division between household consumed and commercialised
speculative. In some districts there will be small surpluses; in 
Zonas Verdes commercialised vegetables are more attractive than 
self-consumed grain; even in deficit zones non-food basic needs 
(e.g. clothes, fuel and light, medical fees) will lead to some 
food crop sales.
